Abstract. In the last years, there has been an increasing demand of a variety of logical systems, prompted mostly by applications of logic in AI and other related areas. Labeled Deductive Systems (LDS) were developed as a flexible methodology to formalize such a kind of complex logical systems. Defeasible argumentation has proven to be a successful approach to formalizing commonsense reasoning, encompassing many other alternative formalisms for defeasible reasoning. Argument-based frameworks share some common notions (such as the concept of argument, defeater, etc.) along with a number of particular features which make it difficult to compare them with each other from a logical viewpoint. This paper introduces LDSAR, a LDS for defeasible argumentation in which many important issues concerning defeasible argumentation are captured within a unified logical framework. We also discuss some logical properties and extensions that emerge from the proposed framework.
Introduction and motivations
Labeled Deductive Systems (LDS) [Gab96] were developed as a rigorous but flexible methodology to formalize complex logical systems, such as temporal logics, database query languages and defeasible reasoning systems. In labeled deduction, the usual notion of formula is replaced by the notion of labeled formula, expressed as Label :f, where Label represents a label associated with a wff f. A labeling language L Labels and knowledge-representation language L KR can be combined to provide a new, labeled language, in which labels convey additional information also encoded at object-language level. Derived formulas are labeled according to a family of deduction rules, and with agreed ways of propagating labels via the application of these rules.
In the last decade defeasible argumentation [CML00,PV99] has proven to be a successful approach to formalizing commonsense reasoning, providing a suitable formalization that encompasses many other alternative formalisms. Thus, most argument-based frameworks share some common notions (such as the concept of argument, defeater, warrant, etc.) along with a number of particular features which make it difficult to compare them with each other from a logical viewpoint.
The study of logical properties of defeasible argumentation motivated the development of LDS AR [Che01,SCG01,CS01], an LDS-based argumentation formalism. In LDS AR two languages L Labels (representing arguments and their interrelationships) and L KR (representing object-level knowledge) are combined into a single, labeled language L Arg . Inference rules are provided in L Arg to characterize argument construction and their relationships. LDS AR provides thus a common framework for different purposes, such as studying logical properties of defeasible argumentation, comparing and analyzing existing argument-based frameworks and developing extensions of the original framework by enriching the labeling language L Labels .
This paper is structured as follows. First, in section 2 we discuss the main definitions and concepts associated with the LDS AR framework. In Section 3 we present some logical properties that hold in LDS AR , and show how different alternative argument-based formalisms can be seen as particular instances of the proposed framework. Then in Section 4 we discuss some particular issues relating LDS AR to modeling scientific reasoning, such as comparing top-down vs. bottom-up computation of warrant, and the combination of qualitative and quantitative reasoning by incorporating numerical attributes. Finally Section 5 summarizes related work as well as the main conclusions that have been obtained.
2 The LDS AR framework: fundamentals 2
Knowledge representation
We will first introduce a knowledge representation language L KR together with a labeling language L Labels . These languages will be used to define the object language L Arg . Following [Gab96] , labeled wffs in L Arg will be called declarative units, having the form Label:wff. 
The language L KR is a Horn-like propositional language restricted to rules and facts.
3 Labels in the language L Labels can be either basic or complex. Basic labels distinguish between defeasible and non-defeasible information, whereas complex labels account for arguments (a tentative proof involving defeasible information) and dialectical trees (a tree-like structure rooted in a given argument). 
Definition 2 (Labeling language L Labels
For the sake of simplicity, we will write T k to denote an arbitrary dialectical label.
Since L KR is a Horn-like logic language, we will assume an underlying inference mechanism ⊢ SLD equivalent to Sld resolution [Llo87] , properly extended to handle a negated literal ∼p as a new constant name no p. Given P ⊆ Wffs(L KR ), we write P ⊢ SLD α to denote that α follows from P via ⊢ SLD .
Definition 3 (Contradictory set of wffs in L KR ). Given a set S of wffs in L KR , S will be called a contradictory set (denoted S ⊢ SLD ⊥) iff complementary literals p and ∼p can be derived from S via ⊢ SLD .
Basic declarative units will be used to encode defeasible and non-defeasible information available for an intelligent agent to reason from a set Γ of labeled wffs. Such a set will be called argumentative theory. Formally:
Definition 4 (Basic declarative units. Argumentative theory). A labeled wff ψ:α such that α is a basic label (either (1) ψ = ∅ or (2) ψ = α) will be called a basic declarative unit (bdu). In case (1), the wff ∅:α will be called a nondefeasible bdu; in case (2), the wff α:α will be called a defeasible bdu. A finite set Γ = { γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ k } of bdu's will be called an argumentative theory. For every argumentative theory Γ we will assume that the set of non-defeasible formulas Π(Γ ) = {∅:α | ∅:α ∈ Γ } is non-contradictory.
Formulas with an empty label correspond to 'strict' knowledge. Thus, ∅:p and ∅:p ← q stand for a fact p and a logic programming clause p ← q. Defeasible facts (also known as presumptions) and defeasible rules are represented by formulas {p}:p and {p ← q}:p ← q. Thus, the classical default "Birds typically fly" will be represented in LDS AR as {fly ← bird }:fly ← bird , whereas the strict rule "Penguins don't fly" will be represented in LDS AR as ∅:∼fly ← penguin. Intuitively, the label of a bdu stands for an initial set of support associated with a formula in the argumentative theory, and is used for consistency check when performing inferences, as discussed later in Sec. 2.2. Example 1. Consider an intelligent agent involved in controlling an engine with three switches sw1, sw2 and sw3. These switches regulate different features of the engine, such as pumping system, speed, etc. Suppose we have defeasible information about how this engine works.
-If the pump is clogged, then the engine gets no fuel.
-When sw1 is on, normally fuel is pumped properly.
-When fuel is pumped properly, fuel usually works ok.
-When sw2 is on, usually oil is pumped.
-When oil is pumped, usually it works ok. -When there is oil and fuel, usually the engine works ok.
-When there is fuel, oil, and heat, then the engine is usually not ok.
-When there is heat, normally there are oil problems.
-When fuel is pumped and speed is low, then there are reasons to believe that the pump is clogged. -When sw2 is on, usually speed is low.
-When sw3 is on, usually fuel is ok.
Suppose we also know some particular facts: sw1, sw2 and sw3 are on, and there is heat. The knowledge of such an agent can be modeled by the argumentative theory Γ engine shown in figure 1. 2
Argument construction
Given an argumentative theory Γ , and a wff p ∈ L KR , the inference process in LDS AR involves first obtaining a tentative proof (or argument ) for p. A consequence relation | ∼ Arg propagates labels, implementing the SLD resolution procedure along with a consistency check every time new defeasible information is introduced in a proof. Figure 2 summarizes the natural deduction rules which characterize the inference relationship | ∼
Arg
. Rules Intro-NR and Intro-RE allow the introduction of non-defeasible and defeasible information in a proof, respectively. Rules Intro-∧ and Elim-← stand for introducing conjunction and applying modus ponens. In the last three rules, a consistency check is performed in order to ensure that the label A together with Π(Γ ) does not derive complementary literals, avoiding logical contradiction. Note that the label A associated with a formula A:h contains all defeasible information needed to conclude h from Γ . Thus, arguments in LDS AR are modeled as labeled formulas A:h, where A stands for a set of (ground) defeasible rules that along with Π(Γ ) derive h. Example 2. Consider the argumentative theory Γ engine from example 1. Then the argument A:engine ok, with
by applying the inference rules Intro-NR twice (inferring sw1 and sw2), then Intro-RE twice (inferring pump fuel ok ← sw1 and pump oil ok ← sw2 ), then Intro-RE twice again to infer fuel ok ← pump fuel ok and oil ok ← pump oil ok , and finally Intro-RE once again to infer engine ok ← fuel ok , oil ok . In a similar way, arguments B:∼f uel ok, C:∼low speed, D:f uel ok and E:∼engine ok can be derived via | ∼ Arg , with
Defeat among Arguments. Warrant
Given an argument A:h based on an argumentative theory Γ , there may exist other conflicting arguments based on Γ that defeat it. Conflict among arguments is captured by the notion of contradiction (def. 3). Defeat among arguments involves a partial order which establishes a preference criterion on conflicting arguments. A common preference criterion is specificity [SL92, SGCS03] , which favors an argument with greater information content and/or less use of defeasible rules. Example 3. Consider the argumentative theory from example 1. Note that the arguments B:∼f uel ok, and E:∼engine ok, are counter-arguments for the original argument A:engine ok, whereas C:∼low speed and D:f uel ok are counterarguments for B:∼f uel ok. In each of these cases, counter-arguments are also defeaters according to the specificity preference criterion [SL92] .
Definition 6 (Counterargument
Since defeaters are arguments, there may exist defeaters for the defeaters and so on. That prompts for a complete dialectical analysis to determine which arguments are ultimately defeated. Note: in order to avoid fallacious argumentation [SCG94] , some additional constraints not given in Def. 9 are imposed on every path (e.g. there can be no repeated arguments, as this would lead to circular argumentation).
Definition 9 (Dialectical Tree
A dialectical tree resembles a dialogue tree between two parties, proponent and opponent. Branches of the tree correspond to exchange of arguments between these two parties. A dialectical tree can be marked as an and-or tree [Gin93] according to the following procedure: nodes with no defeaters (leaves) are marked as U -nodes (undefeated nodes). Inner nodes are marked as D-nodes (defeated nodes) iff they have at least one U -node as a child, and as U -nodes iff they have every child marked as D-node. Formally:
Definition 10 (Marking of the Dialectical Tree). Let A:q be an argument and T A:q its dialectical tree, then:
1. All the leaves in T A:q are labeled as U -nodes.
Let B:h be an inner node of T A:q . Then B:h will be a U -node iff every child of B:h is a D-node. The node B:h will be a D-node iff it has at least one child marked as U -node.
After performing the above dialectical analysis, an argument A which turns to be ultimately undefeated is called a warrant. Formally:
Definition 11 (Warrant). Let A:q be an argument and T A:q its associated dialectical tree, such that its root node A:q is marked as U . Then A:q is called a warranted argument or just warrant
In the context of LDS AR , the construction and marking of dialectical trees is captured in terms of dialectical labels (Def. 2). Special marks (*, U , D) are associated with the a label T(A, . . .) in order to determine whether A correspond to an unmarked, defeated or undefeated argument, resp. In the theory of defeasible argumentation, a warranted argument or belief will be that one which is ultimately accepted at some time of the dialectical process. In LDS AR the concept of warrant can be formalized as follows:
Definition 12 (Warrant -Version 1). Let Cn k * (Γ ) be the set of all dialectical formulas that can be obtained from Γ via | ∼
T by at most k applications of inference rules (i <= k). A literal h is said to be warranted iff
This approach resembles Pollock's original ideas of (ultimately) justified belief [Pol95] . Note that Def. 12 forces to compute the closure under | ∼ T in order to determine whether a literal is warranted or not. Fortunately this is not the case, since warrant can be captured in terms of a precedence relation "< " between dialectical labels. Informally, we will write T < T' whenever T reflects a state in a dialogue which is previous to T' (in other words, T' stands for a dialogue which evolves from T by incorporating new arguments). A final label is a label that cannot be further extended.
Definition 13 (Warrant -Version 2).
5 Let Γ be an argumentative theory, such that Γ | ∼ 
.):h is a warrant. We will also say that h is a warranted literal, or that A:h is a warrant in Γ .
In LDS AR , the construction of dialectical trees is formalized in terms of an inference relationship | ∼ T . Figure 3 summarizes the rules needed for formalizing the above dialectical analysis. Rule Intro-1D allows to generate a tree with a single argument (i.e., a generalized argument which is minimal). Rule Intro-ND allows to expand a given tree T * by introducing new subtrees T *
. . k checks that such subtrees are valid (i.e. the root of every T * i is a defeater for the root of T * , and no fallacious argumentation is present). Rules Mark-Atom, Mark-1D and Mark-ND allow to 'mark' the nodes (arguments) in a dialectical tree as defeated or undefeated. The tree is marked as an and-or tree. Nodes with no defeaters are marked as U -nodes (undefeated nodes). Inner nodes are marked as D-nodes (defeated nodes) iff they have at least one U -node as a child, and as U -nodes iff they have every child marked as D-node.
-C arg = {A:α | Γ | ∼ Arg A:α, where α is a literal in L KR }, which denotes the set of all arguments that follow from Γ ; -C war = {∅:h | there exists a warranted argument A:h based on Γ }, which denotes the set of all warranted conclusions that follow from Γ ;
Cummulativity was proven to hold for argumentative formulae. This allows to think of an argumentative theory as a knowledge base containing 'atomic' arguments (facts and rules), which can be later on extended by incorporating new, more complex arguments. Cummulativity is proven not to hold for warranted conclusions, following the intuitions suggested by Prakken & Vreeswijk [PV99] .
Lemma 1 (Cummulativity for Arguments).
7 Let Γ be an argumentative theory, and let α 1 and α 2 be wffs in
A special variant of superclassicality was shown to hold for both argument construction and warrant wrt SLD resolution: if T h sld (Γ ) denotes the set of conclusions that can be obtained from Γ via SLD, then it holds that C arg (Γ ) ⊆ T h sld (Γ ) and C war (Γ ) ⊆ T h sld (Γ ), where C arg and C war stand for the consequence operator for argument construction and warrant, respectively. This implies, among other things, that the analysis of attack between arguments can be focused on literals in defeasible rules. Formally:
Lemma 2 (Horn supraclassicality for C arg and C war ). Operators C arg (Γ ) and C war satisfy Horn supraclassicality wrt Th sld , i.e. Th sld (Γ ) ⊆ C arg (Γ ) and
Analogously, a variant of right weakening is proven to hold for both C arg and C war . This implies that (warranted) arguments with a conclusion x account also as (warranted) arguments for y whenever y ← x is present as a non-defeasible rule. A full analysis of the logical properties of LDS AR is outside the scope of this paper; for an in-depth treatment the reader is referred to [CS01] .
LDS AR : theoretical considerations and applications
4.1 Computing Warrant: Bottom-up vs. Top-down As described in Section 2.3, the notion of dialectical tree allows to capture the computation of warranted arguments. This notion is relevant in the context of defeasible argumentation in particular, and with respect to scientific reasoning in general. In most implementations of defeasible argumentation (e.g. DeLP [GS03] ), computation of warrant is performed in a top-down fashion, based on a depth-first construction of a dialectical tree. As a marked dialectical tree is an AND-OR tree, an additional α-β pruning can be performed as the tree is built, resulting in a smaller tree, pruned tree. The LDS approach provides a bottom-up construction procedure, as complex labels are built on the basis of more simple ones. It can be proven that warrant can be computed by either of these approaches. In particular, such equivalence result shows that pruning aspects in the top-down approach (commonly used in implemented argument-based systems as [GS03] ) correspond to performing a particular selection of inference rules in the bottom-up approach. 
Variants of LDS AR
Another interesting issue concerns the definition of variants for LDS AR . Since LDS AR is a logical framework, its knowledge-encoding capabilities are determined by the underlying logical language, whereas the inference power is characterized by its deduction rules. Adopting a different knowledge representation language or modifying some particular inference rules would lead to different variants of LDS AR , resulting in a family of argumentative systems. Figure 5 summarizes some of these variants of LDS AR and their relationship to to some existing argumentation frameworks, such as Simari-Loui's [SL92] , MTDR (an extension of the original Simari-Loui approach), Defeasible Logic Programming [GS03] and NLP (normal logic programming), conceptualized in an argumentative setting as suggested in [KT99] . Every variant of LDS AR is denoted as AS x (standing for Argumentative System). Thus, for instance, adopting a restricted first-order language as the knowledge representation language L KR leads to AS SL , a particular instance of LDS AR with a behavior similar to the argumentative framework proposed in [SL92] . Similarly, restricting the language L KR in LDS AR to normal clauses [Llo87] and incorporating an additional inference rule to handle default negation will result in a particular argumentative system AS NLP , a formulation similar to normal logic programming (NLP) under well-founded semantics as discussed in [KT99] . 8 Two distinguished variants of LDS AR deserved particular attention, as they allowed to model two particular cases of defeasible logic programming [GS03] , namely DeLP not and DeLP neg (DeLP restricted to default and strict negation, resp.). Such special cases of DeLP could be better understood and compared in the context of extensions based on LDS AR . 
Extending LDS AR to incorporate numerical attributes
The growing success of argumentation-based approaches has caused a rich crossbreeding with other disciplines, providing interesting results in different areas such as legal reasoning, medical diagnosis and decision support systems. Many of these approaches rely on quantitative aspects (such as numeric attributes, probabilities or certainty values). As argumentation provides mostly a non-numerical, qualitative setting for commonsense reasoning, integrating both quantitative and qualitative features has shown to be highly desirable.
LDS AR can be naturally extended to incorporate such quantitative features, e.g. by adding some certainty factor cf such that cf (f ) = 1 whenever f corresponds to non-defeasible knowledge, and 0 < cf (f ) < 1 whenever f stands for defeasible knowledge. A formula of the form [α, cf (α)]:α in the knowledge base Γ would therefore stand for "α is a defeasible formula which has the certainty factor cf (α)".Similarly, the formula [∅, 1]:α would stand for "α is a non-defeasible formula". Finally, performing an inference from Γ (i.e., building a generalized argument) would result in inferring a formula [Φ, cf (Φ)]:α, standing for "The set Φ provides an argument for α with a certainty factor cf (Φ)".
In [CS02] this approach was first explored, and an extension of the LDS AR framework was defined in order to incorporate numerical attributes. In this extended framework, deduction rules propagate certainty factors as inferences are carried out both in arguments and dialectical trees.
9 It must be remarked that the combination of qualitative and quantitative reasoning has recently motivated the development of general encompassing frameworks, such as the one proposed in [ADP03], which allows to deal with default, paraconsistency and uncertainty reasoning, and is general enough to capture Possibilistic Logic Programs and Fuzzy Logic Programming, among others.
Conclusions
As we have outlined in this paper, Labelled Deductive Systems offer a powerful tool for formalizing different aspects of defeasible argumentation. Many argument-based formalisms exist (e.g. [GS03,PS97,Vre93]), relying on a number of shared notions such as the definition of argument, defeat and warrant. Such formalisms provided the motivation for the definition of LDS AR , in which the above notions could be abstracted away by specifying a suitable underlying logical language and appropriate inference rules. LDS AR provides a formal framework for argumentative reasoning which can be adapted for different purposes. As we have detailed in section 3, LDS AR makes it easier to analyze, compare and relate alternative argumentative frameworks. Relevant logical properties of argumentation can also be studied and analyzed in a formal setting. Arguments in conflict can be compared and weighed wrt to qualitative features (e.g. specificity) or quantitative ones (e.g. certainty factors). Aggregated preference criteria can be defined to properly combine these such preference orderings. The same analysis applies to the construction of dialectical trees. Alternative approaches can extend the original labeling criterion, as in the case of considering accrual of arguments [Vre93,Ver96] when assessing a new certainty factor for the root of a dialectical tree.
In summary, we contend that a general encompassing framework as LDS AR provides an integrated test-bed for studying different issues and open problems related to computational models of defeasible argumentation (such as argumen-tation protocols, models of negotiation, resource-bounded reasoning, etc.). Research in this direction is currently being pursued.
